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CASENOTE
Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers:
What Happens When Freedom of the Press
Collides with Free Speech?
I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 8, 1997, the Supreme Court of Washington decided Nelson
v. McClatchy Newspapers.1 The Court determined that a state law
prohibiting employment discrimination based upon an employee's political conduct could not be constitutionally applied to newspaper

publishers. 2
This case presented a conflict between two well-established, but
polar principles in First Amendment jurisprudence.3 The plaintiff, former Tacoma News Tribune (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribune")
reporter Sandra Nelson, argued that the free press has "no special immunity from the application of general laws" and, therefore, is prohibited
from engaging in employment discrimination. 4 Conversely, the defendant, McClatchy Newspapers, maintained that the First Amendment
shields newspaper publishers from statutory interference with their control of editorial content.5
1. 936 P.2d 1123 (Wash. 1997).
2. See id. At least thirty-seven states have enacted statutes protecting the political activities
or opinions of employees from coercion or retaliation by employers. See Mark T. Carroll,
ProtectingPrivateEmployees' Freedom of PoliticalSpeech, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 58 (1981);
see, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 56, § 33 (1999) (prohibiting an employer from reducing an
employee's wages or ordering a dismissal in order to influence his vote); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 613.040 (1995) (prohibiting interference with an employee's "engaging in politics or becoming
a candidate for any public office").
3. See Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1130-31.
4. Id. at 1130 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) and holding
that an editorial employee's discharge was prohibited under the NLRA and that such prohibition
was not an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of the press); see Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973) (finding that an ordinance
prohibiting sex-designated advertising for non-exempt job opportunities did not violate a
newspaper's First Amendment rights); Oklahoma Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 19295 (1946) (ruling that an act setting minimum wages would not violate the First Amendment if
applied to the newspaper publishing business); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 28
(1945) (holding that newspaper publishers are equally subject to antitrust laws).
5. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (invalidating a state
statute requiring newspapers to print replies of political candidates whose character or record had
been assailed in the newspaper); see also Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Committee,
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This Casenote addresses the impact of Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers in the newsroom as it relates to the enforcement of employment
discrimination statutes. 6 It argues that the Nelson decision may facilitate
camouflaged discrimination by media employers in the guise of "control
of editorial content" and the "appearance of objectivity." Additionally,
it expresses concern over the vast political influence held by newspaper
publishers, who have unfettered authority to force political abstinence on
their employees. This power is particularly disturbing in this era of
media industry consolidation.7
This Casenote discusses case law precedent involving legislative
regulation of newspapers. It concludes that the Nelson decision is an
unjustified extension of Miami Herald v. Tornillo because employment
statutes do not implicate the editorial content of the newspaper where
the protected employee activity has no relation to job performance.
Additionally, this Casenote focuses on the consequences of treating
journalists as second-class citizens by denying them their fundamental
right of access to the political process. It also critiques the journalistic
ideal of complete objectivity.
Many media organizations presently enforce ethical codes that contain overbroad and counterproductive restrictions on the private lives of
their employees. 8 These ethical standards inhibit pluralism in news
reporting and result in the suppression of many compelling stories and
viewpoints. 9 This Casenote concludes by providing suggestions on how
media organizations can amend their journalistic codes of ethics in a
manner that will allow them to protect their product's integrity while
simultaneously affording journalists greater freedom to explore their
identities as citizens, both on and off the job.10
412 U.S. 94 (1973) (holding that the FCC properly refused to compel broadcasters to accept
political advertising).

6. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or to otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his... employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

(a)(1) (1994).
7. See generally BEN BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (1997).
8. For example, reporters for The Denver Post are not allowed to serve on communityrelated boards or school boards. See TOM GOLDSTEIN, THE NEWS AT ANY COST 38 (1985). At
The PhiladelphiaInquirer,the code of ethics warns against activities such as "wearing an antiwar

button at a rally." Karen Schneider & Marc Gunther, Those Newsroom Ethics Codes, COLUM.
JOURNALISM

REV., July/Aug. 1985, at 56, 57. CBS News holds all employees responsible for

ensuring that no family members come into conflict with its policy. See id.
9. See generally Jason P. Isralowitz, Comment, The Reporter as Citizen: Newspaper Ethics
and Constitutional Values, 141 U.

PA.

L. Rv. 221 (1992).

10. For the purpose of this Casenote, the term "newspaper" refers only to "[n]ewspapers that
exist primarily to disseminate ideas but not ideology." Note, Free Speech, the Private Employee,
and State Constitutions,91 YALE L.J. 522, 544 (1982). A partisan paper can arguably qualify as

an "amplifying organization" in which the employer's First Amendment rights are proxies for the

2000]

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FREE SPEECH

The statute at issue, Revised Code of Washington § 42.17.680(2) of
the Fair Campaign Practices Act, states in full:
No employer or labor organization may discriminate against an
officer or employee in the terms or conditions of employment for (a)
the failure to contribute to, (b) the failure in any way to support or
oppose, or (c) in any way supporting or opposing a candidate, ballot
proposition, political party, or political committee."1

Sandra Nelson worked as a reporter for the Tribune from 19831990, covering the city's schools and state educational issues.12 During
her off-duty hours, she was a gay rights activist and a member of the
Freedom Socialist Party.13 Among other causes, Nelson visibly promoted a ballot initiative to restore a city ordinance prohibiting employment and housing discrimination based upon sexual orientation. 4
The Tribune, like many other newspapers and media organizations,
required all of its reporters to refrain from engaging in any publicly visible political involvement.1 5 The Tribune justified this mandate by
asserting that their employees' political activities compromised the

newspaper's credibility and appearance of objectivity to its readers and
advertisers. 16 When Nelson's employers learned of her political activ-

ism, they informed Nelson that her conduct violated the newspaper's
ethical standards.' 7 Although Nelson had never reported on issues
expressive and associational rights of its members." Id. at 538. See Feldstein v. Christian Science
Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974, 979 (D. Mass 1983) (holding that publication of the Monitor was
primarily a "religious activity," enabling the Monitor to "apply a test of religious affiliation to
candidates of employment").
11. This subsection was part of a legislative package that placed limits on campaign
contributions in order to prevent individuals or large organizations from using their financial
strength to "exercise a disproportionate or controlling influence on the election of candidates."
WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.610(1).
12. See Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 936 P.2d 1123, 1124, 1125 (Wash. 1997). As an
"education beat" reporter, Nelson's responsibilities included researching and writing stories
concerning local school districts, as well as legislative and regulatory developments at the state
level involving education issues. See Respondents Brief in Opposition at 3, Nelson v. McClatchy
Newspapers, 118 S.Ct. 175 (1997) (No. 97-187). Prior to her transfer, Nelson received
"excellent" performance evaluations and regular raises from the Tribune. Additionally, her work
for the Tribune earned her journalistic awards from the Freedom Foundation, the Daughters of the
American Revolution, and the Society of Professional Journalists. See Brief of Appellant at 4,
Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 936 P.2d 1123 (Wash. 1997) (No. 62943-9).
13. See Brief of Appellant at 4-5, Nelson (No. 62943-9).
14. Nelson attended and helped organize rallies and demonstrations in support of the
initiative. Nelson was also responsible for gathering endorsements and campaigning door-to-door.
See Brief of Respondent at 7, Nelson (No. 62943-9).
15. See Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1125. In 1983, an Ohio University study found that seventy-five
percent of news organizations maintained some type of prohibition on reporters' political
activism. See Karen Schneider & Marc Gunther, Those Newsroom Ethics Codes, COLUM.
JOURNALIsM REV., July-Aug. 1985, at 55.
16. See Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1125.
17. See id.
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related to her activism, her employers feared that their readers might
question the neutrality of her work or the newspaper's credibility in
general. 18
Nelson continued her activities and, as a consequence, was pun-

ished with a disciplinary transfer to a copy editor position.' 9 Although
Nelson maintained the salary, benefits, and seniority she had earned as a

reporter, she no longer investigated or wrote articles.20 Additionally, her
new position required her to work nights and weekends. 2

Nelson was

told her transfer would not be rescinded "if she continued to engage in
political activism."22
Two years later, Nelson brought suit against her employer for a
violation of Revised Code of Washington § 42.17.680(2), the employment discrimination provision of Washington's Fair Campaign Practice
Act. Nelson asked the court to require the Tribune to reinstate her as a
reporter. 23 The trial court granted McClatchy Newspapers' motion for
summary judgment and dismissed Nelson's suit. 24 The court held that
the defendants had a right under the First Amendment to force political
neutrality on its reporters to "protect the newspaper's unbiased content,
both in fact and as perceived by its readers. 25
Nelson appealed to the Washington Supreme Court.2 6 That court

found that "choosing an editorial staff is a core press function, at least
where that choice is based on editorial consideration. '27 The Court reasoned that the power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own
18. See id.
19. See id. After Nelson was transferred from education reporter, members of the teachers
union, the school district and the Tacoma school board opposed the ouster. See Terry Tang, How
Freedom of the Press Stole a Reporter's Freedom, SEATrLE TIMES, May 17, 1996 at B6.
According to Nelson, her reassignment was a "drudgery and affront to her career." Timothy Egan,
Gay Reporter Wants to Be Activist, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1996.
20. See Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1125.
21. See id.
22. Brief of Respondent at 8, Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 936 P.2d 1123 (Wash. 1997)
(No. 62943-9).
23. See id. at 9. Nelson did not allege that she was discriminated against on the basis of her
sexual orientation. The board of the National Lesbian and Gay Journalists Association (NLGJA)
voted not to support Nelson in her lawsuit, reasoning that the issue was not discrimination against
a gay journalist but whether journalists should be involved in political campaigns. See James
Wallace, Newswoman Loses Appeal of Lawsuits, SEA=IILE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 21, 1997.

But see Brief of Amicus Curiae National Lawyers Guild and Sixty-Seven Co-Signers at 4-6,
Nelson (No. 62943-9) (accusing the Tribune of expressing animus towards Nelson's socialist
feminist politics which "harken[s] back to the McCarthy era when news organizations fired
employees for alleged Communist affiliations and then justified the firing with reference to
objectivity and credibility").
24. See Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1126.
25. Brief of Appellant at 13, Nelson (No. 62943-9).
26. See Nelson, 936 P.2d 1123.
27. Id. at 1133.
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political, social, and economic views is bounded by two factors -

the

acceptance of a sufficient number of readers and the journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers. 28 Therefore, the Court held that a state
law infringing on the publisher's discretion in choosing an editorial staff
is unconstitutional as applied to the publisher.29 The United States
Supreme Court left the ruling intact, denying certiorari review without
30
comment.
II.

PERSPECTIVE

The Nelson court relied heavily upon the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo1 for the
proposition that the state absolutely may not regulate the content of a
newspaper. 32 At issue in Tornillo was a Florida "right-of-access" statute
that required newspapers to publish a reply by any political candidate
whose personal character or official record was assailed by that newspaper.33 The Miami Herald challenged the statute on First Amendment
grounds in an action for a declaratory judgment against a political candidate who had asserted a right of reply. 34 The Court held that it is unconstitutional for the government to compel newspapers to "publish that
which reason tells them should not be published. ' 35 The Court was particularly concerned that the statute "exacts a penalty on the basis of the
content of a newspaper."36 The Nelson court inexplicably refused to
distinguish Washington's anti-discrimination statute, which merely
addressed the publisher's employment practices, from the statute in
Tornillo, which compelled publication of specific content and thus
plainly violated the First Amendment. 7
The holding in PassaicDaily News v. NLRB38 illustrates the dichotomy between editorial discretion in selecting what to print and manage28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See
See
See
418
See
See

id. at 1131.
id. at 1133.
Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 118 S. Ct. 175 (1997).
U.S. 241 (1974).
id. at 258.
id. at 243. FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973) required newspapers to "immediately publish

free of cost any reply he may make thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type
as the matter that calls for such reply."
34. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 245.

35. Id. at 256 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
36. Id. (emphasis added).

37. See Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 936 P.2d 1123, 1133 (Wash. 1997) (Dolliver, J.,
dissenting) (stating that no one has "alleged that application of the statute would impinge upon the
newspaper's exclusive right to determine what to print"); Passaic Daily News v. N.L.R.B., 736
F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
38. 736 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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rial discretion in choosing whom to employ.39 In PassaicDaily News, a
newspaper canceled a weekly column and demoted the columnist
because he helped organize a labor union.40 The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") ordered the newspaper to cease violating the columnist's rights under the National Labor Relations Act, to reinstate the
columnist, and resume publication of his column.4" The newspaper
asserted that "if government may not dictate what words a newspaper
can or cannot print, then it may not question the editorial decision making-process which precedes the printing."42
The court expressly rejected this argument when it upheld the
NLRB's order. It ruled, however, that because of the First Amendment's protection of a newspaper's content, the NLRB could not compel
publication of the reporter's weekly column as a remedy for the illegal
demotion.43 Thus, unlike Nelson, the court in PassaicDaily News properly ordered the newspaper to adhere to the applicable employment laws
while allowing the publishers to retain full editorial discretion.
McClatchy Newspapers similarly should have been ordered to comply
with the statute but permitted to retain control of the content of its publication by editing Nelson's articles and being alert for biases in her
reporting.' This solution would not unfairly burden the Tribune
because it could still dismiss Sandra Nelson or take other managerial
action against her if any actual bias appeared in her articles.
There is no denying that a newspaper's efforts to preserve its editorial integrity are crucial to its operation and within the protection of the
First Amendment.45 However, policies that are related to a newspaper's
public credibility are not automatically immune from judicial scrutiny.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized this proposition.46
According to the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Newspaper Guild of Greater
39. See id. at 1558; see also Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 131 (1936) (rejecting

the argument that under the First Amendment, a newspaper "must have absolute and unrestricted
freedom to employ and to discharge" news editors).
40. See PassaicDaily News, 736 F.2d at 1547-48.
41. See id. at 1548.

42. Id. at 1556 n.20.
43. See id. at 1558.
44. See Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 936 P.2d 1123, 1145-46 (Wash. 1997) (Dolliver,
J., dissenting).
45. See Newspaper Guild of Greater Philadelphia, Local 10 v. NLRB, 636 F.2d 550, 560-1
(1980) ("credibility is central to their ultimate product and to the conduct of the enterprise");
Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1972) ("The power of a
privately owned newspaper.., is bounded by only two factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient
number of readers ... and, second, the journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers.").

46. See Newspaper Guild of Greater Phil., Local 10 v. NLRB, 636 F.2d 550, 560-1 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (holding that the substantive rules of a newspaper's ethical code which do not impact the
credibility of the newspaper are properly the subject of collective bargaining).
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Philadelphia, Local 10 v. NLRB, internal rules adopted to control an
employee's off-duty conduct must be "reasonable" and limited to activities that "directly compromise" the integrity of the journalist or the publication.47 Furthermore, when constructing these codes of ethics, the
court explained that the newspaper's discretion "is not open-ended, but
must be narrowly tailored to the protection of the core purposes of the
enterprise."48
Applying the standard announced by the D.C. Circuit Court,
McClatchy Newspaper's restrictions on Sandra Nelson's conduct in her
private life and her ultimate transfer to the copy desk are unreasonable.
The Tribune failed to offer any evidence showing Nelson's lawful activities had any demonstrable adverse effect on the character or content of
the Tribune.49 The Tribune did not allege that they had lost advertising,
readership, or profits due to Nelson's political activity." In fact, there
was no evidence that any readers, sources, or advertisers even knew that
Nelson was politically active. 1 Most importantly, the Tribune did not
point to a single example of actual bias in Nelson's articles.52 Without
evidence of either actual or perceived bias, the Tribune's asserted connection between Nelson's political activity and the content of the newspaper was based on conjecture. As such, it was too "attenuated, remote
and speculative" to warrant a sweeping First Amendment privilege.53
Prior to Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, only one federal district
court had considered the contention that a newspaper was exempt from
compliance with employment discrimination statutes. 4 That court flatly
rejected this contention. 5 In a suit brought by an unsuccessful candidate for Managing Editor against a newspaper for an alleged gender discrimination violation, the district court in Hausch v. Donrey of Nevada
rejected a newspaper publisher's argument "that applying Title VII to
47. Id. at 561.

48. Id. at 561 n.36 (emphasis added).
49. See Brief of Appellant at 10, Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 936 P.2d 1123 (Wash.
1997) (No. 62943-9).
50. See id.
51. See id. at 11. The Tribune never questioned Nelson's ability to write objectively and
never declined to publish any article submitted by Nelson for this reason. See id.
52. See id.
53. See Hausch v. Donrey of Nevada, 833 F. Supp. 822, 832 n.9 (D. Nev. 1993); see also
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 667 (1991) (holding that "generally applicable laws do
not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental
effects on its ability to gather and report the news"); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682
(1971) ("[Tlhe first amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that
may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes"); cf. University of Penn. v.
E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (refusing to recognize a claim by a university that it has a
First Amendment exemption to Title VII).
54. See Hausch v. Donrey of Nevada, 833 F.Supp. 822 (D. Nev. 1993).
55. See id. at 832.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:359

their newspaper business would, as a matter of law, violate their First
Amendment rights."56 The Court refused "[i]n the absence of any indications of infringement... [to] recognize an expanded First Amendment
right to discriminate in the hiring and firing of editorial employees in
57
violation of Title VII."
McClatchy Newspapers successfully distinguished Hausch by arguing that the alleged gender discrimination in Hausch involved an
"immutable physical characteristic," whereas the Tribune's code of ethics merely addressed "voluntary conduct.' '58 This argument, however,
cannot withstand scrutiny. First, neither Title VII nor § 42.17.680(2) of
Washington's Fair Campaign Practices Act 59 make a distinction between
"physical characteristics" and "conduct. ' 6° Second, this legal standard
would allow newspapers to invoke the First Amendment to discriminate
against employees based upon "conduct" such as the practice of religion
and sexual behavior. 6' For example, a newspaper could refuse to assign
a person adhering to the Islamic faith to any foreign news beat in the
Middle East, on the grounds that his or her religious "conduct" would
taint the reporter and the newspaper with the appearance of partiality,
and readers might view such reporting as prejudiced. By further example, a newspaper could prevent a gay journalist from writing about medical research on AIDS because his homosexual "conduct" might be
perceived as compromising his objectivity on the subject matter. Newspapers could potentially prevent a practicing Catholic from writing
about an abortion rally. The possibilities are endless.
Regrettably, these hypotheticals are not fanciful. The actions of
other newspapers in enforcing similar codes of ethics reflect the breadth
of the codes' sweep. For example, in July 1989, the Vero Beach PressJournaldismissed an education reporter for publicly endorsing abortion
rights, although the reporter had affirmatively sought to ensure that she
would not be assigned to cover abortion-related issues.62 The Troy
Times Record terminated a reporter who had been selected as an alter56. Id. The Court failed to see how Title Vil's prohibitions directly or indirectly infringed on
the Defendant's First Amendment rights. The court distinguished Tornillo because Title VII in no

way requires the newspaper to publish any material it does not wish to publish. See id. at 830.
57. Id. at 832.
58.
(Wash.
59.
60.

Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 15, Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 936 P.2d 1123
1997) (No. 97-187) (emphasis added).
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.680(2).
See generally Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994).

61. Although Title VII does not designate sexual orientation as a protected category from
discrimination, several states and municipalities do prohibit employment discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c (West 1995); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 368-1 (Michie 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 151B, § 4 (Lexis 1999).
62. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington State Labor Council at 6-7, Nelson v. McClatchy
Newspapers, 936 P.2d 1123 (Wash. 1997) (No. 62943-9).
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nate delegate to the 1980 Democratic National Convention, although she
never reported about politics.63 The Associated Press removed a
reporter, who was a born-again Christian, from a state government beat
after he expressed his religious views in an interview with a Christian
newspaper. 64 The PhiladelphiaInquirer once found an employee to be
in violation of its ethics code where a film critic signed a petition protesting the deteriorated condition of a theater.65
In the Nelson case, McClatchy Newspapers' determination that
Sandra Nelson's activities created a conflict of interest was based purely
on speculation about readership perception. 66 When attempting to discern the "confidence level" of their readership, newspapers are likely to
reinforce community values, which may be based primarily on fear,
hatred, and prejudice.67 Consequently, newspapers are more likely to
ask reporters who are members of controversial or minority groups to
refrain from their public activities than reporters belonging to more conventional or popular associations. 68 For example, if Nelson sought to
perform PTA work, or serve as a volunteer for the zoo, it is unlikely she
would be transferred to copy editor, even if her activity created a genuine conflict of interest.69 Although media employers' personnel decisions are purportedly viewpoint neutral, the difficulty in detecting bias
provides media employers with the effective ability not to be viewpoint
neutral. Moreover, Nelson dictates that the newspaper does not have the
burden of proving any adverse reader reaction before demoting or dismissing the employee.7 °
The adoption of less restrictive standards governing journalists'
activism could promote political and sociological diversity among
reporters. This heterogeneity may actually stimulate reader interest with
refreshing and novel perspectives to media reporting. Thus, the standard
justification for codes of ethics-preserving the support of the readership-may not be served if media employers are permitted to continue
enforcing strict codes of ethics.
III.

ANALYSIS

Restrictive conflict of interest standards are flawed because every
63. See id. at 7.
64. See id.

65.
66.
67.
68.

See id.
See Brief of Appellant at 9, Nelson (No. 62943-9).
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington State Labor Council at 3, Nelson (No. 62943-9).
See id.

69. See Mumia Abu-Jamal, The Silencing of Sandy Nelson (visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://
www.socialism.com/ fsarticles/vol 117no2/rnumial72.html>.
70. See Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 936 P.2d 1123, 1132 (Wash. 1997).
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journalist has an interest or affiliation, past or present, that an employer
could perceive as compromising the newspaper's neutrality. 7 Nonetheless, some newspaper editors mandate that reporters avoid all non-journalistic activities: Don't march in rallies, don't run for president of the
school board, don't contribute to the fund for the new library, etc. Journalists, however, cannot be expected to live antiseptic lives, cut off from
all forms of involvement other than their professional endeavors.7 2
If journalists are going to insightfully understand the world about
them-the world they are responsible for interpreting and explaining to
the rest of us-how can they reach that level of understanding achieve if
they deliberately remove themselves from public life? Abstinence from
these activities may prevent conflicts of interest, but does little to
increase journalists' sensitivity, understanding, and knowledge about the
people and events they cover.73 To the contrary, hands-on participation
can provide journalists with the insight, experience, and perspective that
will, in the long run, better equip them to comment on their
community.74
The standard editing process employed in most newsrooms further
discredits employers' purported concerns about the appearance of personal biases in editorial content. 75 As a reporter's initial draft of an article is usually extensively edited by at least one other person prior to
publication, it is unlikely that elements of personal ideological bias
would make their way into the final, published account.76 Moreover,
due to the proliferation of news sources on the internet, the growth of
24-hour-a-day news networks, and the availability of national editions of
major newspapers, editors can check their own reporters' work against
many other sources.7 7
A reporter's awareness of his own potential biases may serve as an
additional check on accuracy and fairness. 78 The ethic of objectivity and
the desire to be promoted and gain respect from colleagues encourages
journalists to take special precautions to guarantee fair coverage of ideo71. See Jason P. Isralowitz, Comment, The Reporter as Citizen: Newspaper Ethics and
Constitutional Values, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 221, 245 (1992).
72. See JOHN L. HULTENG, PLAYING IT STRAIGHT: A PRACTICAL DISCUSSION OF THE ETHICAL

28-30 (1981).
73. See id.
74. See id. at 30.
75. See Jason P. Isralowitz, Comment, The Reporter as Citizen: Newspaper Ethics and
Constitutional Values, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 221, 246 (1992).
76. See id.
77. See David Shaw, Instant Consensus: How Media Gives Stories Same 'Spin', L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 1989, at 1, 33.
78. See Jason P. Isralowitz, Comment, The Reporter as Citizen: Newspaper Ethics and
Constitutional Values, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 221, 246-47 (1992).

PRINCIPLES OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS
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logically adverse newsmakers.79 These factors substantially undermine
claims that bias will inevitably flow from personal involvement. This is
true even where the reporter's outside activity does relate to an issue that
implicates the reporter's beat.
In any case, the appearance of conflict is impossible to avoid completely. Despite newspapers' implementation of strict codes of ethics,
opinion polls indicate that more than half of the public believes that
journalists favor one side or the other when reporting political and social
issues.8o
Newspapers publishers often regard themselves as exceptions to the
policies that keep other staff members out of politics. 8 Daily newspapers often accept valuable advertising from major corporations while
simultaneously reporting on issues dear to the hearts of these corporations.82 On their editorial pages, newspapers opine on controversial
issues covered in their news pages. If one accepts that news coverage
can remain impartial despite the pressures of advertisers, grant money,
and official editorial positions, then it is reasonable to accept that the
activities of journalists that give the mere appearance of a conflict of
interest also will not affect news coverage. If we do not make this
allowance, it seems unfair to demand that journalists adhere to higher
standards than that of their employers.
Sandra Nelson's circumstances at the Tribune provide an example
of this double standard that seems to be in effect in many newsrooms.
At the time of Nelson's transfer, Tribune publisher Kelso Gillenwater,
along with counterparts at Seattle's two daily papers, promoted taxpayer
funding for a new stadium for the Seattle Mariners baseball team.83 The
Seattle Times publisher Frank Blethen provided84 free advertising worth
$40,000 for the promotion of the new stadium.
Although publishers may not be directly involved in covering news
79. See Mrrci-LL STEPHENS, A HISTORY OF NEWS 266 (1988) (opining that most reporters
bury their individual political attitudes when interviewing people with opposing views).
80. See David Rynecki, How Are We Doing?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., Jan.-Feb. 1992 at
15.
81. See Karen Schneider & Marc Gunther, Those Newsroom Ethics Codes, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., July-Aug. 1985, at 55, 57.
82. Historical evidence and commentary suggests that the rise of advertising played a
significant role in the decline of "partisan" newspapers. Advertisers "wanted less criticism of
public officials and reminded publishers that partisanship hurt circulation and, consequently,
advertising revenues." See Gerald J. Baldasty & Jeffrey B. Rutenbeck, Money, Politics And
Newspapers: The Business Environment of Press Partisanship in the Late 19th Century, 15
JouRNALIsM HIST. 60, 63 (1988).

83. Kelso Gillenwater subsequently agreed to chair the state Higher Education Coordinating
Board. See Sandy Nelson, Publishers Play the Game With Two Sets of Rules, (visited Nov. 1,
1998), available in <http://www.socialism.com/sandy.html>.
84. See id.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:359

related to their own political activity, the fact of their participation in
political affairs creates a real danger of affecting coverage by their subordinates who do have those beats." Publishers argue that their own
community participation is necessary to protect their investment in the
newspapers. 86 Reporters and editors, however, also have stakes in their
communities and should be permitted to exercise their rights as citizens
to participate in their communities-as long as their participation does
not interfere with their reporting.87 This is especially true of journalists
who are minorities or activists for less conventional causes. Their interests are often disproportionately underrepresented in the legislature, lobbying organizations, and society-at-large. Therefore, the removal of
even a single activist from their cause may have a greater impact than
removing an activist from a group that already has a guardian of their
interest in the community or legislature.
The fact that the Tribune continued to employ Nelson as a copy
editor, thereby giving her the responsibility of editing and rewriting all
of the copy that goes into the paper, demonstrates that the Tribune publishers were not concerned about Nelson injecting her personal bias into
the content of the paper.8 8 The Tribune was apparently concerned with
the potential of Nelson writing first draft copy, with a byline identifying
her by name, causing some unknown hypothetical reader to react
adversely to the newspaper.
A more appropriate journalistic code of ethics would allow journalists to participate freely in their communities, politics, and civic organizations outside of working hours. The participation would have to be in
a personal capacity with no attempt to make a connection to the
publisher.
As the United States Supreme Court has consistently emphasized,
the right to participate in the political process is the guardian of all other
rights.89 The lesson of these decisions is that it is the paramount duty of
85. See generally Karen Schneider & Marc Gunther, Those Newsroom Ethics Codes, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REv., July-Aug. 1985, at 55, 57.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. As copy editor, Nelson was responsible for writing headlines, captions for photographs,
and editing a wide variety of local and national stories. See Brief of Appellant at 37, Nelson v.
McClatchy Newspapers, 936 P.2d 1123 (Wash. 1997).
89. See, e.g., Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184
(1979) ("[Fjor reasons too self-evident to warrant amplification here, we have often reiterated that

voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure."); Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 629 (1969) ("The presumption of constitutionality
and the approval given 'rational' classifications in other types of enactments are based on an
assumption that the institutions of state government are structured so as to represent fairly all the
people.") (footnote omitted).
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courts to ensure that all persons have access, on an equal basis, to the
political process by which they can defend their own rights and interests.
The implications of the Nelson decision reach far beyond the
harmed media employees in the State of Washington. Under the "marketplace of ideas" rationale for free expression, we are all harmed in our
search for truth whenever political speech is repressed.9" Additionally,
many states have enacted employment discrimination laws protecting
political conduct. 91 Therefore, the Nelson decision, which is the first to
interpret such a statute in the context of the free press, may be particularly persuasive in other jurisdictions.
The Nelson decision renders media employees in the State of
Washington second-class citizens deprived of their right to participate in
the political process. This restriction is not only an affront to the individual liberty interests of reporters, but also may "effectively exclude
from public discourse the most informed and articulate voices of the
citizenry." 92 The institutional imperative of avoiding the "appearance of
impropriety" is simply an inadequate justification. Newspapers should
amend their ethical standards to allow newsroom personnel, at a minimum, to retain their free speech and political participation rights as to
outside activity that has no relation to the substance of their reporting.
In the meantime, journalists for many newspapers continue to walk
a tightrope-somewhere between living their own lives as citizens of
the world and staying as far away as possible from non-journalistic
involvement that would reflect on their trustworthiness as journalists.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although it is difficult to decide to allow the State to interfere with
a newspaper's internal policies, codes of ethics in the newsroom should
contain a modicum of reason when they broadly restrict political activism. The claim that abstention from outside activity is integral to producing unbiased accounts does not withstand scrutiny.
In their zeal to demonstrate purity, news organizations often reach
too far into the personal lives of their employees by regulating outside
activities that pose no real conflict. As for the industry's concerns about
its image problems, codes of ethics alone will not restore the public's
trust. "What is required is fair and through reporting and vigilant edit90. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
91. See supra note 2.
92. Jason P. Isralowitz, Comment, The Reporter as Citizen: Newspaper Ethics and
Constitutional Values, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 221, 223 (1992).
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ing-in short, professionalism on the job. 93 Publishing a newspaper or
producing a newscast is a lot more difficult than drafting an ethics code.
Improving the performance of reporters and editors, however, will pay
more dividends than worrying about what they do once they've left the
office.
ADAM HOROWITZ*

93. Karen Schneider & Marc Gunther, Those Newsroom Ethics Codes, COLUM.

JOURNALISM

REv. July-Aug. 1985, at 55, 57.
* This Casenote is dedicated to my parents, Judy and Sheldon Horowitz, who believed in
me before I believed in myself. I also wish to thank Professor John Hart Ely and Alan Quiles for
their thoughtful insights.

